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Selon l’article 164, le droit ecrit du traité a au dessus de lui le Droit avec un D
majuscule, le Droit non ecrit, l’Idée du droit. Et la Cour doit assurer le respect de ce
Droit
C. Kakouris, La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes comme Cour
Constitutionnelle: Trois Observations
While a transnational conception of the rule of law requires the engagement of
and commitment to the EU project from all actors involved, this begs the question
as to what happens when the assumptions underlying art. 2 TEU are no longer
applicable? For the rule of law, 2019 has been of fundamental importance because
we have been taught important constitutional lessons and started getting answers to
some of the most crucial constitutional questions. While much still remains shrouded
in mystery and question marks are aplenty, at least the judicial trajectory for the rule
of law in 2020 has been set in 2019.
Know Your Enemy: The Rule of Law Crisis
For starters, one must be very clear that not everything should be grouped under
the high-handed tag of “the rule of law crisis”. When properly defined, it is not
about well-intentioned disagreements among reasonable democrats on how best
to implement a technical piece of EU law. There is a categorical difference between
a lack of implementation of EU law and/or interference with citizens’ EU rights
and the blatant rejection of the Court of Justice’s (“the Court”) authority, targeting
national judges for sending preliminary rulings to the Court or masterminding a hate
campaign against the judges that dare to say “no” to such practices of intimidation
and fear-mongering and now stripping the European mandate of national judges
of any practical significance. It is exactly these extreme examples of rule of law
breaches that demand and will continue to demand in 2020 and beyond (see my
forthcoming analysis) the explicit spelling out of the core of the EU rule of law read
in the light of the rule of law’s objective. Excluding arbitrariness as a widely agreed-
upon rationale for the rule of law must translate into constructing the core of the rule
of law principles that are shared by all as part of once implicit and non-negotiable
elements of the original consensus that brought all its parties together. If such a
core cannot be agreed upon and enforced in times of crisis, then, the integration
project itself is being undermined and loses its ethos. While commitment to the EU
project by all actors involved is absolutely crucial, one of the tenets of the rule of law
crisis is that today such an assumption is no longer valid, but rather a counterfactual
as not all member states are ready to acknowledge that the values are indeed
shared. Quite to the contrary, they question the common understanding of some
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basic ideas, chief among them, the rule of law. The rule of law crisis makes clear
that there must be no free riding and that there must be EU content of the rule of
law and standards binding on all. The rule of law, while clearly anchored in the
domestic legal systems and traditions, must take on its own meaning if it is indeed
to serve as a behavioral yardstick. If there is one indisputable lesson from the rule
of law crisis this is exactly it. One should be clear and precise about the language,
though. Agreeing on the core is never about imposing uniformity but rather about
enforcing these basic features of the legal order that are essential to its functioning,
and more broadly, survival. This is not “imposed uniformity” but acceptance of being
bound by the essential principles that make up the EU. The EU will lose its ethical
face exactly when it fails to enforce these agreed-upon constitutional essentials.
This would only acknowledge the oft quoted and driven by the hopeless status quo
saying that the EU has a body but not a soul. After all, if we cannot find the core
of our commitments, then the whole political community that the EU undoubtedly
is, loses much of credence and credibility. The choice of words (enforcing credible
commitments, not imposing uniform standards) is particularly important as it frames
and orders our discourse about the rule of law as we struggle to move along. All too
often too much is read into the differences, instead of focusing on, and locating, the
commonalities that are shared.
The Existential Jurisprudence
Contrary to fears expressed here and there, art. 2 TEU is not to be enforced against
the Member States in the abstract and the Union would not claim an unfettered
competence. Granted the rule of law enforcement must involve all the actors and
not just the Court, but the EU political institutions have not been ready to defend
the rule of law as vigorously as it deserves. All too often political calculations led
to embarrassing silence and short-term bargaining. The issue of great practical
importance is what happens when the EU institutions fail in their loyalties to the
Union legal order and simply look the other way. This is exactly when the Court, and
not other institutions, as has often been the case in the past, stands as a last resort
in the way of the Union falling apart. Judge T. Koopmans was quite right when he
remarked that “the Court of Justice is aware that lack of judicial interference may
very well mean that nothing will happen at all”.
Thanks to the developments in 2019, there are already six constitutional signposts
along the rule of law trajectory: i) art. 2 TEU is not declaratory but has a substantive
dimension; ii) the Court has clearly embraced art. 2 TEU as the hard core of the
EU law and made it justiciable. iii) Art. 2 TEU is not only political, but imposes
legal duties which are enforceable by, and before, the Court through art. 19 TEU;
iv) Art. 19 TEU serves as the jurisdictional trigger irrespective of any linkage to
substantive EU law other than art. 2 TEU and the duty to respect the values spelt out
therein; v) Member States are under a legal duty to have independent courts as a
general matter of state organization; vi) the general obligation to guarantee judicial
independence of national courts is directly grounded in the Treaties (art. 2 TEU as
a rationale and art. 19 as a jurisdictional trigger) and thus there is no need (as some
still argue…) to extend the jurisdiction of the Court.
- 2 -
Art. 19 TEU: a guiding star
While the concrete manifestations of the rule of law are always subjective and a
matter of choice, it is argued that the “traditional” catalogue and recap of the rule
of law-inspired general principles has been good for the times where the narrative
was driven by “business as usual”. Yet, integration A.D. 2019 is anything but. While
the projection of the rule of law through an amalgam of principles has been a staple
of the field, much more is needed today. The EU needs to break from the status
quo and build its own rule of law discourse. The rule of law must be seen as a meta
principle that settles the most fundamental question of belonging and identity of
meta politics. Instead we get a fairly conventional and uncontroversial recap of the
state of art, while the times of the rule of law crisis invite academia to move beyond
such traditional incantations. Today the role of the rule of law must go beyond mere
instrumentalization. It defines and determines the legal standards that are then
implemented through principles. The rule of law dictates commands and has a life if
its own, rather than being simply expressed through principles.
Often-heard criticism is that the rule of law is always tailored to the objectives of the
legal order and the continuation of the EU project, rather than the objectives of the
Treaties being interpreted with the rule of law as a stand-alone and overarching meta
principle. The challenge thus is flipping this dominant discourse, and moving beyond
  the usual talk and analysis focused merely  on the rule of law as seen through the
operation of principles. The rule of law as a meta principle dictates certain principles
rather than being simply channeled and expressed through them. In 2019, the EU
needs rule of law manifestations that would have teeth and bite the dark forces
behind the rule of law crisis. This is exactly where art. 19 TEU offers a rescue path.
It is clear that art. 19 TEU plays a special role and build around the effective judicial
protection by independent courts as the undisputable core of the European rule of
law. As the opening quotation by C. Kakouris emphasizes the untapped remedial
potential of art. 19 TEU (“The Court shall ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaty the law is observed”), 2019 saw the Court following up on
this powerful idea (and a dream) of the “unwritten law” that underpins the special
ethos of membership in the “Community based on the rule of law”. As interpreted by
the Court in the Polish cases, art. 19 TEU emerges as the complete and stand-alone
one in that it dictates its own sphere of application and builds the legal discipline to
which it subjects the Member States. Often heard arguments that it is impossible to
establish a unitary conception of the rule of law at the EU level, should be qualified
today by the emerging tendency to spell out exactly this: core constitutional elements
that distinguish the EU rule of law. By introducing and then repeating over and over
the novel terms “essence” and “essential”, the Court speaks the meta-language of
identity and specificity of the EU legal order. Judicial independence as such is not an
intrinsic value, rather it is instrumental to ensure the observance of a first-order right
that is the right to a fair trial. The very existence of effective judicial review designed
to ensure compliance with EU law is essential for the rule of law and it is the duty
of every Member State to ensure that the courts meet the requirements essential to
effective judicial protection in accordance with art. 19 TEU. These dicta clearly show
that the rule of law is no longer simply an objective, value etc. but rather that the
right to a fair trial, effective judicial protection and independence of the judiciary are
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becoming First Principles of the EU rule of law. They command very concrete duties
in the European public space. Art. 19 TEU starts playing two fundamental roles in
this process: it provides a normative and axiological anchoring for the rule of law and
it serves as the jurisdictional trigger to enforce and protect the values of art. 2 TEU.
In the light of all this how true then the assertion by Judge Koopmans sounds in
December 2019 …
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